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Information Content of Aggregate and Individual Insider Trading 
 







We examine the impact of aggregate insider trading on market returns in the UK. We find 
that, on aggregate, insiders are contrarians, but their trades are not informative, contrary to 
previous US evidence. We suggest that this discrepancy is related to the regulatory setting in 
the UK where insiders have to report their trades within six days. Then we analyse the short-
run market reaction to insider trades and find that the information content of insider trading is 
limited to the period surrounding the announcement dates. We show that market-to-book, 
company size, stock volatility and market volatility have a significant impact on reporting 
period returns. In addition, we find that the market reaction is much weaker after controlling 
M/B and size. Finally, we show that insiders time in high volatile stocks, and following high 
market volatility.    
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Previous studies show that insiders are contrarians as they buy shares following a price 
decline and sell after a price run up. However, the extent to which such trades convey 
information is mixed. For example, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insider trades are 
not informative in the short run. In contrast, Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) show 
that insider trades do convey information to the market as share prices increase (decrease), 
subsequently to their buy (sell) trades.  The impact of aggregate insider trading on the market 
is examined in the existing literature. For example, Seyhun (1988) shows that net aggregate 
insider trading activity in a given month is significantly and positively correlated with the 
market return during the subsequent 2 months. Seyhun (1992) documents that for the period 
from 1975 to 1989, the aggregate net number of open market purchases and sells by corporate 
insiders in their own firms predict up to 60 percent of the variation in one year ahead 
aggregate stock returns. Knewtson, Sias and Whidbee (2010) show that demand by aggregate 
insiders predicts time series variation in the value premiums. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 
show that insiders in aggregate are contrarian traders but they have better predictive ability 
than simple contrarian strategies. Marin and Oliver (2008) investigate insider trading activity 
prior to crashes and find that insider purchases remain low all year long, but increase only 
one month prior to the share price jump. On the other hand, Fahlenbrach and Stultz (2011) 
find that bank CEOs did not reduce their shares holdings in anticipation of the crisis or during 
the crisis. As a result, they suffered extensive wealth losses in the wake of the crisis1.  
However, the literature that investigates the impact of aggregate insider trading on 
market returns focuses in the US, and to the best of our knowledge, no study focuses in the 
UK. We consider the shortcomings and unresolved puzzles in the insider trading literature to 
explore further the information provided by the corporate insiders and relate it to the 
alternative information environment in which they trade. Insiders in the UK are more likely 
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to possess superior information because they are limited to executive and non-executive 
directors. In contrast, in the US, the definition is much broader as officers, key employees 
and large shareholders are all considered as insiders. Moreover, the differences in insider 
trading regulations and in reporting periods2 between the UK and the US can provide 
additional insights.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this research investigates 
whether managers use market sentiment as a platform to act like contrarians. According to 
Seyhun (1988), insiders sell after significant stock price increases and buy after price 
declines. Similar results are documented for the aggregate insider trading (e.g., Seyhun 
(1992) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001)).  In line with this, Jiang and Zaman (2010) assert that 
contrarian strategy implies insider trading as a reaction to market returns. We use market 
states to test the contrarian behaviour of insiders. If managers use the market platform to act 
like contrarians, their purchases are expected to dominate in bear periods, and their sell trades 
during bull periods. We define the bull market as January 1999 to March 2000 and January 
2004 to December 2007 and bear period as April 2000 to December 2003. Furthermore, we 
test whether there is asymmetric price response of buy and sell trades in bull and bear 
periods.  
6HFRQGWKLVVWXG\WHVWVZKHWKHUWKHLQVLGHUV¶YLHZGLIIHUVV\VWHPDWLFDOO\IURPPDUNHW
valuations, and they try to take advantage of a potential misvaluation. Previous research on 
insider trading finds that insiders try to take advantage of perceived mispricing, suggesting 
market timing (Jenter (2005), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Rozeff and Zaman (1998)). 
There is evidence that insider trading is not random in value and glamour stocks (Rozeff and 
Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Gregory, Tharyan and Tonks (forthcoming)3). 
They also show that contrarian strategies are useful in market timing. Recently, Knewtson, 
Sias and Whidbee (2010) show style timing by the insiders. We carry an out-of-sample test 
4 
 
for managerial timing by corporate insiders and the information content of such trades under 
UK institutional setting where the trades are reported relatively quicker contrary to the US 
reporting regulations. Third, this study investigates whether insiders are actively involved in 
small companies, and whether their timing skill is confined to small companies.  
Fourth, recent evidence shows that trading by insiders does not convey information 
after controlling for M/B and size (Jenter, 2005). Similarly, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find 
that after controlling for M/B and size, insider trades in most firms do not predict subsequent 
stock returns in the long run. This research tests whether insider trades in the UK are 
informative in the short run after controlling for size and M/B. Finally, we test whether 
information asymmetry as measured by stock and market volatility have an impact on the 
PDUNHW UHDFWLRQ WR LQVLGHUV¶ WUDGHVDV LQ.\OH  :HH[WHQG WKHSUHYLRXV OLWHUDWXUHE\
documenting timing in high volatility stocks and following a period of high market volatility.  
Our results can be summarised as follows. We find that net purchase ratio (NPR) is 
positive (negative) in bear (bull) market, which implies that insiders purchase (sell) in the 
EHDUEXOOPDUNHW7KHFRQFOXVLRQKROGVDIWHUFRQWUROOLQJIRULQVLGHUV¶FRQWUDULDQEHKDYLRXU
In general, the aggregate insider trading is consistent with contrarian behaviour.  However, 
the aggregate insider trading does not predict market returns. In addition, when we analyse 
individual trades, the behaviour and price response of insider trades is not asymmetric in bull 
and (bear) markets. Third, we find that the perceived mispricing, as measured by market-to-
book ratio, affects significantly the market reaction to the trades in the short run. Fourth, 
Insider purchases convey additional information to the market, as this study finds 
economically and statistically significant returns around the announcement period. However, 
these returns vary with size, M/B, stock volatility and market volatility. The finding that most 
of the abnormal returns vary with M/B and size is consistent with the view that insiders trade 
based on perceived mispricing and smaller companies.  
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses existing literature, and sets up the 
hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4, the relationship between market return 
and aggregate insider trading is analysed. Section 5 presents the results of the event period 
returns. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Related Literature and Hypothesis 
 
Previous research unanimously shows that insiders are contrarian traders. For example, 
Seyhun (1986, 1992) shows that insiders are more likely to sell (purchase) shares following 
periods of significant price appreciation (declines), consistent with insiders trading in 
anticipation of subsequent price reversals. Assuming that markets consist of two types of 
traders, informed and uninformed (noise), and stock prices are affected by the trading of both 
types of traders, then prices can move away from fundamental values (Shiller, 1984; De Long 
et al., 1990). It is possible that noise traders may drive market prices away from intrinsic 
values even in the absence of new information. Hence, a stock that was trading roughly at its 
intrinsic value could decline (rise) significantly because of such noise trading. Corporate 
insiders may then perceive the stock to be undervalued (overvalued) and buy (sell) it. Such a 
relationship would be viewed as insiders following a contrarian investment strategy. Brennan 
DQG&DRVKRZWKDWSRRUO\LQIRUPHGDJHQWVDUHµWUHQGFKDVHUV¶SXUFKDVLQJPRUHULVN\
security when its price rises and selling when price falls, while better informed agents acts 
like contrarians, selling on a price rise and buying on a fall. These arguments lead us to set up 
the following hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 1: For individual trades as well as aggregate measure of insider trading, 
insiders are expected to buy (sell) after a significant decrease (increase) in 
price, and following the trade, there should be a price reversal. 
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If the contrarian strategy is employed by insiders at the firm specific level then there 
should be no relation between market returns and insider trading. On the other hand, if 
³QRLVH´ WUDGLQJ LV D PDUNHW ZLGH SKHQRPHQRQ WKHQ D UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ DJJUHJDWH LQVLGHU
trading and market return should exist (Jiang and Zaman, 2010). In this case, market returns 
would predict insider trading behaviour. Chowdhury, Howe and Lin (1993) and Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001) provide evidence that aggregate insider trading is driven by the contrarian 
strategies. We test whether insider trading pattern is different across the bull and bear 
markets, i.e. whether insider buying is higher in bear market and insider selling is higher in 
bull market. If insiders use a market platform to act like contrarians, we expect them to buy in 
bear periods, and sell in bull periods, to reflect their expectations of price reversals. 
Therefore, we split our sample period into bull (01/1999 to 03/2000 and 01/2004 to 12/2007) 
and bear (04/2000 to 12/2003) periods to assess the trading patterns of insiders4. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no difference in buying (selling) in bear vs. bull period. 
A related question would be whether there is any difference in the market reaction to 
insider trading in bull (bear) market. Chiyachantana et. al. (2004) consider this question in the 
context of institutional trading. They claim that differential market reactions to buy and sell 
trades depend on market conditions. They argue that in bullish markets the suppliers of 
liquidity will not push down prices, following a sell order, as it is easy to find a buyer. In 
contrast, in bearish markets institutions have to offer discounts to find buyers for their sell 
orders, which results in buys (sells) having a bigger and permanent price impact in bullish 
(bearish) markets. On the other hand, Friederich et. al. (2002) assert that an additional reason 
for contrarian trades to be informative, is that in bearish markets there is a high demand for 
good stocks which depress the price of smaller stocks. Corporate insiders may see this as the 
time to buy stocks at bargain prices if they KDYHµLQVLGH¶LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHVWRFNV7RRXU
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knowledge, no study considers this impact in the case of insider trading. Therefore, we set up 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: There is no difference in price impact between the bull and bear market 
condition of buy and sell trades.  
Rozeff and Zaman (1998) show that insider transactions are not random across growth 
and value stocks. Insider buying increases as stocks change from growth to value categories. 
Insiders buy heavily in value stocks and sell glamour stocks (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001 and 
Jenter, 2005). Gregory, Tharyan and Tonks (forthcoming) report that directors buy (sell) in 
value (glamour) stocks earn positive (negative) returns and they persist up to two years after 
WKHGLUHFWRUV¶WUDdes. They also report that abnormal returns are particularly concentrated in 
smaller value stocks. All of the aforementioned studies examine the value-glamour strategy 
in the long run. Recognising the fact that value-glamour strategy are more relevant in the long 
run it would be useful to examine the market reaction to insider trading in the short run in the 
UK where trades are reported relatively quicker.  
Hypothesis 4: Market reaction is higher (lower) for value (glamour) stocks in the short run. 
The existing literature clearly demonstrates that insiders trade in small companies, and 
earn higher abnormal returns. In contrast, when they trade in large companies excess returns 
are relatively small. For instance, in the US, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insider 
trades in small companies convey more information compared to large companies, when 
measured around the reporting period. In the UK, Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis 
(1994) find that the abnormal returns are concentrated in smaller firms. After the seminal 
work by Fama and French (1993), the variable size becomes important in event studies. In the 
insider trading literature, the importance of size cannot be overlooked (e.g., Gregory, Matatko 
and Tonks, 1997). Moreover, there is evidence that the buy trades of insiders are mainly 
concentrated in small firms (Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988). In addition, Loughran 
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and Ritter (2000) argue that the behavioural timing depends on undervaluation, and it is 
easier to take advantage of any undervaluation in small firms, because if the stocks are 
mispriced, the arbitrage forces will push the prices towards their fundamental values. Hence,  
correcting the misvaluations for any large firms compared to small firms. These arguments 
suggest the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: The market evaluation of insider trading is expected to be dependent on the 
size of the company to reflect the level of asymmetric information and risk. 
Jenter (2005) finds little evidence that managers use inside information in their trades. 
The excess returns after controlling for size and book-to-market effects are indifferent from 
zero. However, these results do not suggest that managers never use valid inside information 
when making private and corporate decisions.  He argues that his results are consistent with 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who document that insider trading does not predict subsequent 
returns, once size and book-to-market effects are controlled for. There is some predictability 
of excess returns in the case of equity purchases in small firms, but no predictability of excess 
returns is found for the sell trades. On the other hand, recent research using UK data shows 
that insider buy and sell trades trigger an immediate market reaction of 1.16% and -0.26% 
respectively (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). We test whether insider trades in the UK convey 
information after controlling for M/B and size effects.  
Hypothesis 6: After controlling for size and M/B, the excess returns of insider trades are not 
different from zero. 
,QVLGHUV¶possess superior information about the firm and information asymmetry is 
the focal point to insider trading (Aboody and Lev, 2000). If there are environments of 
symmetric information, insider trades would have hardly triggered any market reactions. In a 
market with higher level of information asymmetry insider trades will have a higher price 
impact (see, for instance, Kyle, 1985; and Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Hence, asymmetric 
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information should be positively related to the variance of returns. Marin and Oliver (2008) 
define market crash and jumps in terms of standard deviations and find a relationship with 
insider trading. We hypothesise here that volatility is positively related to the market reaction 
to insider trades. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 7: Insider purchases (sells) triggers higher (lower) market reaction for high 
volatility stocks. 
3 Data  
 
This research uses Directors Deals D ODUJH GDWDEDVH RI DOO 8. ILUPV¶ GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDGHV
spanning from January 1999 to December 2007, to collect data on trades undertaken by 
LQVLGHUV RI RXU VDPSOH FRPSDQLHV 7KH GDWDEDVH LQFOXGHV QHZV LWHPV RQ GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDGHV
disclosed by all UK firms to the Regulatory News Service (RNS). We exclude a number of 
observations that are not likely to be driven by private information, such as exercise of 
options or derivatives, script dividends, bonus shares, rights issues, awards made to directors 
under incentLYH SODQV RU UHLQYHVWPHQW SODQV $OVR DOO GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDQVDFWLRQV LQ LQYHVWPHQW
FRPSDQLHVDUHH[FOXGHG$IWHUWKLVVFUHHQLQJZHREWDLQLQVLGHUV¶WUDGHVIURPWKH8.
market. We check the data for errors and exclude 2,952 (8%) trades as the difference in 
announcement and transaction date is more than 5 days. The final sample includes 33,991 
GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDGHV LQ  OLVWHG FRPSDQLHV VSOLW LQWR   SXUFKDVHV DQG 
(23%) sell trades. This insider-trading database includes transaction price, amount, and value, 
post-transaction holding, change in holding, name and position of the insider, and 
announcement and transaction dates, as UK insiders can delay up to five days the 
announcement of their trade, but most report their trades on the RNS on the transaction date 
(Korczak and Lasfer, 2009). 
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The sample period covers two interesting sub-periods: the bull period (January 1999 to 
March 2000 and January 2004 to December 2007) and the bear period (April 2000 to 
December 2003) in the stock markets, which allows us to test whether insiders time their 
trades differently under different market conditions. Adjusted daily share prices, data on 
FTSE All Share Price Index, market capitalization, market- to-book ratio are taken from 
DataStream.  
4 Market Return and Aggregate Insider Trading  
 
4.1 Measure of Aggregate Insider Trading 
 
It is expected that insiders react to market returns if they are contrarians (Jiang and Zaman, 
$OVRZHH[SHFWPDUNHWUHWXUQVWR³SUHGLFW´DJJUHJDWHLQVLGHUWUDQVDFWLRQVVHH5R]eff 
and Zaman, 1998; Chowdhury, Howe and Lin, 1993; and Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).  Such a 
relationship is consistent with the proposition that insiders follow a contrarian investment 
strategy. This paper tests whether insiders are contrarians by using aggregate insider 
transactions. If insiders are contrarians, it is expected that market returns will affect aggregate 
insider trading. In other words, an increase (decrease) in market price will lead insiders to sell 
(buy). We then relate insider sell (buy) to market conditions as measured by bull (bear) 
markets. Since, in the bull market prices are up, higher insider sells are expected. In contrast, 
in bear market prices are down, hence higher insider purchases are expected. 
Following Lakonishok and Lee (2001), this paper uses net purchase ratio (NPR) 
which is the ratio of net purchases to total insider transactions, for measuring the aggregate 
insider trading activities. Each month starting from January 1999 to December 2007, the total 
numbers of insider purchases and sells are calculated. Pound Sterling volumes of insider 
trading are also computed. We then calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate number 
(volume) of insider purchases by the total aggregate number (volume) of insider transactions. 
11 
 
We use market returns for 6, 12 and 24 month horizons as a predictor of insider trades. 
Return on FTSE All Share price index is used as a proxy for market return. Figure 1 shows 
that there is a negative relationship between NPR and market returns, which supports the 
contrarian behaviour.    
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The following regression model is estimated to examine the relationship between 
aggregate insider trading and return on market: ୲ ൌ Į ൅ ȕሺሻ୲ 
Where, NPR is the aggregate insider trading activity in month t, ሺሻ୲ is the prior k-holding 
period return on market at time t. A negative relationship is expected between NPR and prior-
return as contrarian strategy implies a buy (sell) after a price decline (rise). Since, NPR is 
positive (negative) if insiders are net buyer (seller) then we expect prior-return (PR) should 
be negatively related to NPR.  
 
4.2 Regression results  
4.2.1 Impact of pre-event returns on aggregate insider trading 
 
We use 6-, 12-, 24- month prior return to examine whether the insiders buy (sell) as a 
reaction to market returns. Table 1, Panel-A and Panel-B, reports regression results based on 
NPR number of transactions and NPR money volume, respectively. In all the regressions, we 
find that prior-return over k-period is statistically and economically significant. The negative 
sign of PR implies that insiders are contrarians and suggest that insiders sell after a price rise, 
and they buy after a price decline. The results are consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 
and Jiang and Zaman (2010). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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Although all the coefficients of prior-return are negative, the coefficient of PR 
becomes smaller as the holding period become longer. For example, the coefficient is -2.02 
when 6 month prior return is used compared to -0.55 when 24 month prior return is used. 
This provides evidence that insiders rely more on recent price performance. The adjusted R2 
also declines from 23.7% to 8%. Similar results are obtained using the NPR measure based 
on money volume. The predictive power of money volume based NPR is higher than the 
number of transaction based NPR. It may imply that when market moves are larger insiders 
make large trades.  
4.2.2 Aggregate insider trading in bear and bull markets 
 
After examining the relationship between market return and aggregate insider trading 
DFWLYLW\WKLVVWXG\IROORZVDVLPLODUPHWKRGRORJ\WRWHVWZKHWKHULQVLGHUV¶WUDGLQJLVUHODWHG
to market conditions. Net purchase ratio (NPR) is used as aggregate measure of insider 
trading activity. The following model is estimated:  ? ? ?௧ ൌ  ? ൅ ȕ ൅ Ȗሺሻ୲ 
 
BB is a dummy equal to one for two periods: January 1999 to March 2000 and January 2004 
to December 2007. Bear market is from April 2000 to December 2003. ୲ is the NPR of 
aggregate insider trading activity in month t, ሺሻ୲  is the prior k holding period return on 
market at time t. 
Table 2 shows the mean and median net purchase ratios in the bull and bear markets. 
We calculate the NPR based on amount of shares traded and Pound Sterling value of trades. 
The mean NPR (value) for bull and bear market is -0.59 and -0.23, respectively. It shows that 
the NPR is more negative when the market is in bullish state compared to bearish state. The 
medians are very closer to means. NPR (amount) shows that in bull market it is negative 
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while in bear market it is positive, suggesting that insiders are net sellers in bull market and 
net buyers in bear market.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Figure 2 shows that in bear market most of the NPRs are positive suggesting that 
insiders are net buyers. In bull market (shaded area) most of the NPRs are negative, meaning 
insiders are net sellers. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Table 3 reports the results on the regressions. In the first regression, we only use the 
BB dummy as an independent variable to examine the effect of bull (bear) market on NPR. In 
the other regressions, we use 6-, 12-, 24-month prior returns with the BB. The results are 
consistent with the notion that insiders buy trades increases in bear market and insider sell 
trades is higher in the bull market. Both the NPR measures are negatively related to BB 
dummy, suggesting that insider buy in the bear market with an expectation to sell in the bull 
market. Table 3 shows that insiders use the bull (bear) markets as a platform to act like 
contrarians. The evidence holds even after controlling for the contrarian behaviour of the 
insiders by incorporating prior-returns. After controlling for contrarian strategies, it is shown 
that insiders further use bull (bear) market to time the market. For example, in Panel A, the 
second regression shows that after controlling for 6-month prior returns insiders use bull 
(bear) market to sell (buy) securities.  
4.2.3 Predictability of post trade returns 
The previous section reports that insiders are contrarians. Here, it is tested whether the 
aggregate insider trading predicts future market returns. If insider trades are informative, a 
positive relationship between aggregate insider trading measure (NPR) and future market 
return is expected.  The following regression is estimated to examine the relationship between 
aggregate insider trading and return on market: 
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 ? ሺ ? ൅ ୑ǡ୩୲ା୘௧ୀ௞ ሻ െ  ? ൫ ? ൅ ୤ǡ୩൯ ൌ Ƚ ൅ Ⱦ୲୲ା୘୲ୀ୩ ൅ ɀ ? ?୲     
 
Where,  ?୑ǡ୩ is the market return in month k, ୤ǡ୩ is the monthly treasury bill rate in month k, ୲  is the NPR of aggregate insider trading activity in month t,   ? ?୲   is the prior two 
year holding period market return at time t5. We include the prior two year holding period 
return in the regressions to control for the fact that insiders are contrarians, following 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001). We also control for the momentum factor documented in 
previous studies, as stocks that perform the best (worst) over a 3 to 12 month period tend to 
continue to perform well (poorly) over the subsequent 3 to 12 months (Jagadeesh and Titman, 
2002). We control for the fact that the current market return is affected by the previous 
market returns. By dRLQJWKLVLWZRXOGEHSRVVLEOHWRVHSDUDWHRXWWKHLQVLGHU¶VLQIRUPDWLRQ
from simple contrarian strategy/momentum effect.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 reports the regression results for 3, 6, 9 and 12 month holding period. The 
coefficient NPR is negative and significant in most of the regressions. For example, Panel A, 
Table 4 shows that the coefficient of NPR is -0.05 (t=3.28) for the 3-month holding period, 
which shows that insider trading predict stock prices contrary to the expectations. For the 
alternative holding periods the results are qualitatively similar. For money volume, similar 
results are obtained for holding periods 3 and 9, while for holding periods 6 and 12 the 
coefficient is not significant. Overall, the results show that insider trading predicts market 
return in the opposite directions to expectations. The negative coefficient of NPR is contrary 
to the findings of earlier studies done in the US market (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) 
suggesting that the aggregate insider trading does not convey enough information to forecast 
future prices. Since the insider trades in the UK market are reported within 6 days, the 
information is short-lived.6 It might be possible that insider trading in the UK does not covey 
15 
 
enough information to predict the aggregate market returns. Since insiders are net sellers (as 
NPR is negative for most of the time period) and individual sell trades do not convey 
information (as the returns are statistically and economically insignificant) the results of 
aggregate insider trading is partially consistent with that.    
 
5 Event Period Returns 
 
5.1 Descritive Statistics and Information Content of Insider trades 
 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics and t-tests for differences in means. Panel A presents the 
mean differences for company fundamentals. We measure size as the market value of equity before 5 
days of the trade, M/B as the market value to book value of equity before 5 days of the trades, 
Stock volatility as standard deviation of stock measured from -240 to -41 days window 
relative to the trade, and market volatility as standard deviation of market index over the 
same window. The results show strong differences between buy and sell trades. The average 
company size for buy and sell trades are different, and, a t-test of differences in means shows 
that they are statistically different. This is an early indication that the stocks insiders buy and 
they sell are different, which is consistent with previous literature (e.g. Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001). The average M/B is also different for buy and sell trades. Furthermore, the mean 
difference t-test shows that they are statistically different.  
7DEOH3DQHO%UHSRUWVWKHUHVXOWVRQWKHPDUNHWUHDFWLRQWRLQVLGHUV¶WUDGHV)RUWKH
whole sample the cumulative abnormal returns for buy trades over the pre-event periods [-40, 
-2] is negative and highly significant. In contrast, before the sell trades the abnormal returns 
are positive and significant. The results clearly indicate the contrarian strategies adopted by 
insiders and the impact of the trades on the announcement dates as well as the post-trade 
performance.   
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The event day and post-event day returns for buy trades are positive and significant. 
In contrast, for the sell trades, the event day returns are negative, but not significant7. 
Interestingly, the post-event day abnormal returns are not negative and not significant for sell 
trades.  After the buy trades, share prices recover to a certain extent. However, after the sell 
trades, share prices do not decline, rather the trend stops and share prices level off.  These 
results support the earlier findings that the buy trades convey information, but the sell trades 
are not informative (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). The t-test of differences in mean shows that 
the buy and sell trades are different.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) note that the abnormal returns around the reporting dates are not 
economically meaningful, though, statistically significant. For example, they report abnormal 
returns of 0.13% and -0.23% for purchases and sells, respectively around reporting day. 
However, their findings are contrary to our results where we find abnormal returns of 1.02% 
and -0.13% for buy and sell trades respectively. In addition, we find that the abnormal returns 
for the buy trades are statistically and economically significant when measured around the 
announcement date, which is consistent with Fidrmuc et al. (2006). 
5.2 Market Sentiment and Price Impact of Insider Trades: Univariate 
Results 
This study examines the price impact asymmetry and hence tests for market timing by 
splitting the sample period into bull (01/1999 to 03/2000 and 01/2004 to 12/2007) and bear 
(04/2000 to 12/2003) periods. We find that the behaviour of share prices following buy and 
sell trades does not depend on market conditions (Table 6). The mean difference t-tests show 
WKDWWKHEHKDYLRXURI&$5¶VRYHUGLIIHUHQWHYHQWZLQGRZVLVQRWVLJQLILFDQWO\GLIIHUHQW7KH
only exception to this is that buy trades over the estimation window [-40,-2] in bull and bear 
markets show significant differences. Our results are in line with Korczak and Lasfer (2009), 
who find that the behaviour of share prices following buy and sell trades does not depend on 
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market conditions. These findings are in contrast with Chiyachantana et al. (2004) who assert 
that in a bull market, suppliers of liquidity are suspicious of buy orders, and run up the prices 
in the face of a strong buying interest.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Chiyachantana et al. (2004) argue that suppliers of liquidity are not so cautious about the 
institutional sell orders in a bullish environment and do not run down prices so much when 
they face selling interests. In bearish markets the situation is exactly the opposite. In a bullish 
market, buys have a bigger price impact, and in bearish markets sells have a bigger price 
impact. However, we find evidence, which is almost contrary to this argument. The absolute 
magnitude of CARs for buy trades in bear periods are higher than the bull period trades [-
5.53 vs. -3.14, 1.12 vs. 0.92, 2.23 vs. 2.03 over the event window (-40,-2), (-1, +1), (+2, +40) 
respectively]. The only evidence which is consistent with Chiyachantana et al. (2004) is the 
DEVROXWHPDJQLWXGHRIWKHVHOOWUDGHV¶&$5LQWKHEear period, which is higher than sell trade 
[-0.26 vs. -0.001 over the event window (-1, +1)]. However, for both buy and sell trades, we 
do not find any significant difference in price response in bull and bear periods.  
5.3 Market-to-book Quintiles: Univariate Analysis 
The previous section examines the price impact asymmetry in bull (bear) markets. This 
section assesses whether there are any connections between company fundamentals and the 
timing of insider trades. By following Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 
DQG -HQWHU  ZH K\SRWKHVL]H WKDW LQVLGHUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI IXQGDPHQWDO YDOXH GLYHUJH
systematically from market valuations, and the perceived mispricing is an important 
determinant of the insiders decision making. The tests in this section are also consistent with 
value strategies, where investors buy low M/B stocks, which have performed poorly in the 
past and sell stocks with high M/B which performed well in the past. 
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We form quintiles according to M/B ratios to test whether insiders buy undervalued 
shares, and sell overvalued shares and whether they time their trades.  A major difference 
between the current study and Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) is in 
forming those quintiles. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) rank their companies into deciles each 
year by annual book-to-price ratios. Similarly, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) divide their 
sample into three book-to-market (B/M) groups based on the B/M ratio at the end of April of 
each calendar year. The annual measures are not likely to be good proxies for market 
mispricing and insiders timing in the context of individual insider trading where the trades are 
announced daily. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) examine whether value (growth) strategy 
adopted by insiders can earn different returns in the long run. However, in this paper our 
objective is to examine whether there is any significant difference in the market reaction to 
insider trading in the short run in value and growth stocks. That is why, we compute the 
market-to-book ratios 5 days announcement dates to form M/B quintiles. M/B ratios for all 
trades are obtained for 5 days prior to the trade. The companies are sorted in quintiles each 
year by M/B ratios. Similar procedures are applied to form quintiles based on size. This study 
tests the hypothesis that insiders buy (sell) shares in their own company if they perceive that 
their company is under- (over-) valued. We analyse the short-term abnormal returns in the 
pre-trade (-40, -2) and post-event (+2, +40) periods. We then split the sample into quintiles 
EDVHGRQHDFKILUP¶VPDUNHW-to-book ratio. The market-to-book is estimated 5 days prior to 
WKHWUDGHIRUFDSWXULQJWKHLQVLGHUV¶GHFLVLRQV,IWKHLUGHFLVLRQWRWUDGHLVEDVHGRQPDUNHW-to-
book, it should be as close as possible to the announcement date of the trade and not the 
beginning of the year. Low (high) M/B companies are expected to generate higher (lower) 
abnormal returns in the post-trade periods, if insider trading signals under- (over-) valuation, 
and the market revalues these companies after the trade. The pre-event return will be higher 
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as we move from low M/B to high M/B quintiles. On the other hand, the event and post event 
returns will be smaller as we move from low to high M/B quintiles. 
The analysis of M/B quintiles show evidence of signalling over- (under-) valuation 
(Table 7, Panel A; and Figure 3). Low M/B companies (value stocks) are companies that are 
perceived to be undervalued. We expect insiders in these companies to signal undervaluation 
when they purchase shares, resulting in positive post-event abnormal returns.  As expected, 
for buy trades, as we move from low M/B to high M/B stocks, the post event abnormal 
returns are getting smaller. For example, the CAR for quintile 1 is 3.46 (t=5.72) and for 
quintile 5 is 0.79 (t=1.08) in the post event window. The mean difference t-test indicates that 
quintile 1 is statistically different from quintile 5. Also, the chi-square test for differences 
among the means reject equality of means. The results on pre-event returns also support our 
expectations. As we move from low M/B to high M/B stocks, the pre event abnormal returns 
DUH ODUJHU7KHPHDQVRI µYDOXH¶ ORZ0%DQGµJODPRXU¶ KLJK0% VWRFNVDUHGLIIHUHQW
Moreover, the chi-square test shows differences among the means. When insiders buy in low 
M/B companies, the immediate price reaction of trades and price recovery is much higher, 
compared to high M/B companies. This is consistent with value strategies.   
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
In contrast, high M/B stocks are glamour stocks, which are likely to be over-valued. 
The post-VHOOWUDGHV¶DEQRUPDOUHWXUQVLQWKHVHFRPSDQLHVVKRXOGEHQHJDWLYH7DEOH3DQHO
B and Figure 4 show that for sell trades do not show very strong evidence of signalling over-
valuation. Only, the pre-HYHQW ZLQGRZ &$5V VKRZ VRPH HYLGHQFH RI LQVLGHUV¶ V\VWHPDWLF
trading based on their perceptions about the company. For example, the CARs are getting 
higher as we move from value stocks to glamour stocks in the pre-event period, which is 
consistent with theory. There are also differences in mean between value and glamour stocks. 
However, the chi-square test does not indicate that there are significant differences among the 
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quintiles. The event-day and post-event day returns are not fully consistent with predictions. 
None of the CARs across the M/B quintiles are statistically significant. The mean difference 
t-test is not significant and the chi-square test shows there are no significant differences 
among the means. Overall, insiders sell after a significant rise in prices and the trend stops 
following their sell trades. Hence, there is weak evidence of timing. Our results suggest that 
LQVLGHUVDUHDEOHWRWLPHWKHLUWUDGHVEXWWKH\DUHQRWIXOO\FDSDEOHRIFKDQJLQJWKHPDUNHW¶V
perception regarding tKHLUILUP¶VWUXHYDOXH,QVXPWKHUHVXOWVSURYLGHSDUWLDOVXSSRUWIRUWKH
proposition that insiders follow growth strategies when they sell their shares.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
5.4 Size Quintiles: Univariate Results 
Table 8, Panel A and Figure 5 show the univariate results on size quintiles. The results show 
that there is evidence of market timing by the insiders for small stocks. If managers have 
timing abilities in small companies, we expect pre-event cumulative abnormal returns to be 
higher as we move from small to large companies. Also, event and post-event abnormal 
returns will be lower as we move from small to large companies.  In the case of buy trades, 
even though the signs are as predicted the pre-event returns do not increase as expected when 
moving through the quintiles. For instance, for smallest size quintile CAR is -2.25 (t= -2.69) 
compared to -2.93 (t= -4.87) for large size quintile stocks. The mean difference t-test between 
small and large companies is statistically insignificant, but the chi-square test for the 
differences in means for different quintiles is highly significant.   
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In terms of event and post-event CARs the results are in line with our expectations.  
For example, the event day CARs are gradually declining as we move from small to large 
companies (3.02, 1.22, 0.76, 0.15 and -0.12 respectively with the latter two not being 
statistically significant).  The post-event CARs also show similar patterns (2.95, 3.47, 2.36, 
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0.94, 0.48 respectively, with all being significant except the last one). Furthermore, the mean 
difference t-test between small and large companies shows significance at 1% level for event 
day and post-event abnormal returns. The evidence is substantiated by the chi-square test 
which shows that there is significant difference across the means over the different quintiles 
for both event-day and post-event returns. Overall, the results support the proposition that 
insiders buy shares after a significant price decline; that after purchases share price recovers; 
and that this behaviour is more pronounced for small firms.  
The results for the sell trades do not provide strong evidence of market timing in the 
case of small companies (Table 8, Panel B and Figure 6). The pre-event window CARs show 
PL[HG HYLGHQFH RI PDQDJHUV¶ V\VWHPDWLF WUDGLQJ EDVHG RQ WKHLU SHUFHSWLRQV DERXW WKH
company. For example, the CARs are getting higher as we move from quintile 1 to quintile 3 
and then decline again. Additionally, there are no significant differences in means between 
small and large stocks and the differences across the quintiles are not statistically significant. 
The event-day and post-event day returns are not fully consistent with our predictions. None 
of the CARs across the size quintiles are statistically significant, except the post-event return 
for quintile 1. The mean difference t-test is not significant for event-day returns and the chi-
square test shows that there are no significant differences among the means. Overall, insiders 
sell after a significant rise in prices and the trend stops after they sell. This shows weak 
evidence of timing. Therefore, the results indicate that insiders are able to time their buy 
trades but not their sell trades in the case of small companies. This is consistent with 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) in the US and Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis (1994) in the 
UK, who find that insiders timing ability is more pronounced in small firms.  
5.5 M/B and Size Sorting of Abnormal Returns 
This section provides two-way sorting based on M/B and size. The purpose of two-way 




We examine in this section whether the same applies in the UK. In the case of buy trades, 
most of the results in earlier analysis were driven by small companies and low M/B 
companies (Table 9). For example, the event period returns show that all the returns across 
M/B quintiles are significant only for small company quintile. None of the event period 
returns are significant for the large company quintile. In addition, the post-event returns are 
significant in small company quintile and all the post-event returns are insignificant in large 
company quintile. This implies after controlling for market to book and size insider purchases 
do not convey any information. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
For example, the event-day return for largest company quintile and largest M/B 
quintile is even negative (-0.58, t = - 0.98). The post-event return for the largest company and 
high M/B quintile is also negative (-0.31, t=-0.23). These results are consistent with earlier 
findings in the US that most of the insider returns are not indistinguishable from zero, once 
the size and M/B effects are controlled for.  However, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that 
the abnormal returns around the reporting dates do not depend on size or M/B. We find that 
the reporting period abnormal returns are directly related to M/B and size. Our results are 
consistent with the view that smaller companies are associated with more information 
asymmetry and hence the market reaction is higher. Smaller companies are also more risky, 
which may yield higher returns when insiders trade.   
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
5.6 Stock and Market Volatility sorting 
In this section, we sort the CARs from low to high stock volatility8.  The results show that for 
buy trades, low volatility stocks display lower price drops in the pre-event window and the 
market reaction is smaller immediately and post-event period compared to the high volatility 
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stocks. The mean difference between low and high volatility is highly significant. In addition, 
we find that the means are different across all the quintiles for the pre-event and event 
window. However, for sell trades, the CAR is lower for low volatility stocks during the pre-
event window compared to high volatility stocks. Furthermore, the means between high and 
low volatility stocks are significantly different and the chi-square test, shows that the means 
across quintiles are not homogenous. The results imply that insiders have more knowledge in 
high volatile stocks. 
 When we sort the stocks based on market volatility the results are similar. For buy 
trades, the higher the market volatility prior to the trades, the higher the market reaction. This 
holds for both the event and the post-event window.  The post-event market reaction for low 
volatility (0.97%) is significantly lower compared for high volatility (3.46%). Regarding the 
sell trades, they are preceded by high market volatility and the market reaction in the post-
event period is positive and significant (1.89% with t=2.93). The mean difference between 
low and high is highly significant, and chi square rejects the null of homogeneity. In sum, we 
find that high (low) stocks, and market volatility prior to the LQVLGHUV¶ trades is related to high 
(low) market reaction.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
5.7 Cross Sectional Variation in Abnormal Returns 
This section runs cross-sectional regressions to control for a number of factors 
simultaneously. The overall results of univariate analysis show that insiders buy (sell) 
undervalued (overvalued) stocks as measured by M/B and find evidence of market timing in 
the purchase of small company stocks. In particular, as we move from low to high quintiles 
for M/B, size, stock volatility and market volatility for the pre-event, event and post-event 
abnormal return varies. Clearly, these provide evidence that the abnormal returns vary with 
M/B, size, stock volatility and market volatility.   
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Therefore, we estimate the following model seperately for the buy and sell trades: 
1 2 3 4( ) /j j j j jCAR Ln Size M B StockVol MktVol BBDum
Year Industry
D E E E E N
J T
     
   
where: 
Ln (size) is log of firm size measured as market value of equity 5 days before the trade, M/B 
is market-to-book ratio, where market value of equity is taken 5 days before the trade and the 
book value is the book value of equity at balance sheet date, Stock Vol  is standard deviation 
of stock returns over -240 to-41 days, Mkt Vol=  is standard deviation of market returns over -
240 to-41 days, BB Dum  is a dummy equal to 1 for Bull Market.  
In order to isolate the pure cross-sectional component of the M/B and size effect on 
insider trading, a set of regressions are estimated using the entire sample period from 1999 to 
2007. The results are reported in Table 12. The M/B effects are negative and significant in the 
case of buy trades, suggesting that managers buy undervalued stocks. These findings are 
consistent with the M/B quintile analysis. Therefore, the insider trading decisions are 
influenced by the relative market valuations. We also examine the impact of size on LQVLGHUV¶
market timing ability.  The coefficient is negative and significant for the buy trades, which is 
consistent with the evidence that insiders try to time the market in case of small companies. 
For buy trades, both the stock and market volatility are positive and significant in most cases, 
suggesting that risky stocks earn higher returns, and high market volatility is related to higher 
returns. This is consistent with Huddart and Ke (2006), who assert that for companies where 
information asymmetry is higher, the abnormal returns are higher. In sum, the results suggest 
that insiders time their buy trades. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
For sell trades, M/B has a positive but not significant relationship (Table 12). The sign 
is consistent with our predictions suggesting that insiders sell overvalued stocks. 
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Furthermore, size has a negative relationship and market volatility has a positive relationship 
but only for the post-event market reaction CAR (+2,+40). Overall, the results suggest that 
M/B, size and market volatility significantly affect the market¶V reaction to insider trading.  
Finally, the documented pattern of insider purchases and sells across M/B, size, stock 
volatility and market volatility quintiles could also be due to some omitted variable 
measuring and unobserved heterogeneity across firms in different quintiles. One crude 
measure of heterogeneity across firms is the industry in which they operate. It is well 
established that the market-to-book ratios in the same industry tend to move together and that 
several industries are characterized by extreme valuations. Some particular businesses are 
considerably more investment intensive and the company size of that industry can be larger 
than other industries. Therefore, in order to determine whether the market-to-book and size 
effect on insider trading is simply an industry effect, we incorporate industry dummies in the 
regressions. Finally, for assessing whether the results are not time dependent, we also include 
year dummies in our regressions. In none of the cases, the industry dummies or year dummies 
are significant, suggesting that our results are not driven by industry or time effects.  
6 Conclusion 
This study employs a unique data set to test whether insiders time their trades or not. This is 
one of the first studies to examine aggregate in insider trading in the context of UK. We find 
that on an aggregate basis, insiders are contrarians but aggregate insider trading does not 
predict monthly returns. This is consistent with the view that the information content of 
insider trading is limited to the period surrounding the announcement dates. We then examine 
whether insider trading is related to the market sentiment as measured by a bull (bear) 
market. The aggregate insider trading activity shows a relationship between LQVLGHUV¶market 
timing and market sentiment as measured by bull (bear) periods. This provides evidence that 
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insiders use market sentiment as a platform to act like contrarians. However, we do not find a 
significant difference in the price response during bull and bear periods. 
Further, this study examines whether there are any relationships between company 
fundamentals and the timing of insider trades, as addressed in Rozeff and Zaman (1998), 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jenter (2005) and Gregory et al. (forthcoming). Insiders tend to 
buy stocks with poor past performance, and those that are cheap according to proxies such as 
the market-to-book ratio. Consistent with the existing literature, the insiders¶DELOLW\ to time 
their trades is not homogeneous across all market capitalization groups. Insiders have a 
relative advantage in timing, in the case of small stocks compared to large stocks. 
Additionally, the results show that insider purchases convey information, while sells are not 
associated with low returns. This is consistent with Kallunki, Nilstrom and Hellstrom (2009) 
who report that portfolio rebalancing, tax consideration and behavioural biases are the most 
important reasons for insider trading. We show that the information asymmetry has an 
important impact on the market reactions to insider trades as in Kyle (1985).   
The results call into question as to whether insiders are able to earn excess returns 
with their trades when controlling for size and M/B effects. Recent insider trading literature 
confirms the finding that most excess returns to insider trades can be explained by the size 
and M/B effects, and suggests that the economically significant excess returns in older studies 
is due to the lack of control for these observable firm characteristics (Jenter, 2005). The most 
comprehensive study of insider trading by Lakonishok and Lee (2001) shows that most of the 
return predictability through insider trades vanishes once size and M/B are controlled for. 
However, we find that there is still some predictability of excess returns left when using 
equity purchases in small firms, but we find no predictability of excess returns on the sell 
side. Finally, we show that insiders show timing ability in highly volatile stocks, and 
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Table 1. Aggregate Insider Trading and Market Return 
Prior Return(months) Constant PR  ࡾ૛തതതത 
















     


















     
This table reports the regression results from the following model. ୧ǡ୲ ൌ Ƚ ൅ Ⱦሺሻ୧ǡ୲ + İi,t 
Where, NPR of aggregate insider trading activity in month t,  ሺሻ୧ǡ୲  is the prior k-period 
holding period return on market at time t. We predict market returns for 3, 6, 9 and 12 month 
horizons. Each month starting from January 1999 to December 2007, we calculate the total 
numbers of (and the total Pound sterling volume) of insider purchases and sells. We then 
calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate number (volume) of insider purchases by the 
total aggregate number (volume) of insider transactions. The Newey-West autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***,**,* represent significant 
at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.  
 
 





Bull Bear Bull Bear P-value of mean diff. (bull-bear) 
      
NPR (amount) -0.25 0.12 -0.28 0.11 0.00 
NPR (value) -0.59 -0.23 -0.62 -0.28 0.00 
      
This table represents mean (median) of net purchase ratio for each month from January 1999 
to December 2007. The bull market and contains two periods (January 1999 to March 2000 
and January 2004 to December 2007). For each month, we calculate the total numbers of (and 
the total Pound Sterling volume) insider purchases and sells. We then calculate the NPR by 









Table 3. Aggregate Insider Trading and Bull/Bear market 
Prior return 
(Months) 
Constant BB Dummy PR ࡾ૛തതതത 
























































This table reports the regression results from the following: 
 ୧ǡ୲ ൌ  ? ൅ Ⱦ ൅ ɀሺሻ୧ǡ୲ 
 
Bull Market, BB, includes two periods: January 1999 to March 2000 and January 2004 to December 2007. Bear 
market is from April 2000 to December 2003. ୲୧  is the NPR of aggregate insider trading activity in month t,  ሺሻ୧ǡ୲  is the prior two-year holding period return on market at time t. Each month starting from January 1999 
to December 2007, we calculate the total numbers of (and the total Pound sterling volume) of insider purchases 
and sells. We then calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate number (volume) of insider purchases by the 
total aggregate number (volume) of insider transactions. We use 6, 12 and 24 ±month prior returns. The Newey-
West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***,**,* represent 




















    
Table 4. Predictive Ability of Post-trade Returns 
Holding Period(months) Constant NPR PR24 ࡾ૛തതതത 
Panel A Number of  transactions    
3 -0.01(-1.11) -0.05 (-3.28) *** 0.03(0.79) 12.3 
6 -0.02(-1.22) -0.07(-2.90) *** 0.04(0.59) 13.9 
9 -0.03(-1.31) -0.11(-3.48)*** 0.02(0.22) 15.8 
12 -0.05(-1.40) -0.14(-3.33) *** -0.01(-0.12) 14.4 
     
Panel B Money Volume     
3 -0.02(-2.49) -0.04(-1.86)* 0.03(0.64) 8.0 
33 
 
6 -0.04(-2.06) ** -0.05(-1.57) 0.05(0.56) 7.6 
9 -0.06(-1.87) * -0.07(-1.69) * 0.04(0.30) 5.9 
12 -0.07(-1.56) -0.07(-1.25) 0.02(0.14) 2.0 
This table reports the regression results from the following model.  ? ሺ ? ൅ ୑ǡ୩୲ା୘௧ୀ௞ ሻ െ  ? ൫ ? ൅ ୤ǡ୩൯ ൌ Ƚ ൅ Ⱦ୲୲ା୘୲ୀ୩ ൅ ɀ ? ?୲     
Where,  ?୑ǡ୩ is the return on market in month k, ୤ǡ୩ is the monthly treasury bill rate in month k, ୲  is the NPR of aggregate insider trading activity in month t,   ? ?୲   is the prior two year 
holding period return on market at time t. Each month starting from January 1999 to December 2007, 
We calculate the total numbers of (and the total Pound sterling volume) of insider purchases and sells. 
We then calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate number of insider purchases by the total 
aggregate number of insider transactions. We predict market returns for 3, 6, 9 and 12 month 
horizons. The Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in the 





Table 5. Descriptive Statistics and Market Reaction of Insider Trades 
 
Panel A: Fundamentals 
 Buy trades Sell trades (p Buy-sell) 
 Mean Median Mean Median  
Size (Market Cap) 5073.86 403.1 6817.81 403.34 0.02 
M/B 2.28 1.46 3.94 2.34 0.00 
Stock Volatility 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.019  
Market Volatility 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011  
Number of Observations 26,268  7,723   
 
Panel B: Market Reaction of Insider trades 
 Buy trades Sell trades (p Buy-Sell) 
















This table represents descriptive statistics of the companies in our sample and event study results. Panel A 
represents company fundamentals. Size is the market value of equity before 5 days of the trades, M/B is the 
market value to book value of equity before 5 days of the trades, Stock volatility is standard deviation of stock 
measured from -240 to -41 days window, and market volatility is standard deviation from market from the same 
window. Panel B SUHVHQWVFXPXODWLYHDYHUDJHDEQRUPDOUHWXUQVDURXQGGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJHYHQWVFRPSXWHG
using event study methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -240 to -41 
relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. All results are reported 
UHODWLYH WR GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ DQQRXQFHPHQW GD\ LH WKH GDWHRI WKH SXEOLF DQQRXQFHPHQWRI GLUHFWRUV¶

































Table 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Different Market Condition 
Event window Full Sample Bear Period Bull Period P Bear-Bull 
 Panel A: Buy 
No. of observations 26,268 
 
























 Panel B: Sell 
No. of observations 7,723 
 
























7KH WDEOH SUHVHQWV FXPXODWLYH DYHUDJH DEQRUPDO UHWXUQV DURXQG GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ HYHQWV
computed using event study methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over 
days -240 to -41 relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. 
The full sample includes  GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDGHV LQ  OLVWHG FRPSDQLHV VSOLW LQWR 
purchases and 7,723 sell trades. All resXOWV DUH UHSRUWHG UHODWLYH WR GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ
DQQRXQFHPHQW GD\ LH WKH GDWH RI WKH SXEOLF DQQRXQFHPHQW RI GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ 7he bull 
period covers from January 1999 to March 2000 and January 2004 to December 2007 and the bear 
period covers April 2000 to December 2003. The last column represents the p-values from mean 
difference t-test. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 

























Table 7. Distribution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Market-to-Book 
 Market to Book Quintiles   
 Low 2 3 4 High P
 High-Low 2 (4)F  











































































event study methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -240 to -41 
relative to the event date, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. The full 
sample includes GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDGHV LQ  OLVWHGFRPSDQLHVVSOLW LQWRSXUFKDVHVDQG
7,723 sells. $OOUHVXOWVDUHUHSRUWHGUHODWLYHWRGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJDQQRXQFHPHQWGD\LHWKHGDWH
of tKHSXEOLFDQQRXQFHPHQWRIGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJ7KHPDUNHW-to-book quintiles were formed 5 
days before the announcement dates. If we define t as the event date then we use t-GD\V¶0%UDWLR
to form quintiles based on the M/B ratio. In forming the quintiles we first sort the CARs by year 
according to Market-to-book ratio. Each year we then sort the CARs in quintiles by market-to-book 
ratio. Finally, we sort them based in quintiles. In doing so, we have removed the year effect from M/B 
quintiles. P high-low UHSRUWVWKHSYDOXHRIPHDQGLIIHUHQFHWHVWEHWZHHQ&$5¶VIURPKLJKHVW0%YHUVXV
lowest market-to-book quintiles. The last column reports chi-square test for differences in means 
across market-to-book quintiles. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significant at 



















Table 8. Distribution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Size 
 Size Quintiles   
 Small 2 3 4 Large P
 small-large 2 (4)F  











































































7KHDERYH WDEOH UHSUHVHQWVFXPXODWLYHDYHUDJH DEQRUPDO UHWXUQV DURXQGGLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJE\
using event study methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -220 
to -41 relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. The full 
sample includes GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDGHV LQ  OLVWHGFRPSDQLHVVSOLW LQWRSXUFKDVHVDQG
7,723 sells. All results DUHUHSRUWHGUHODWLYHWRGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJDQQRXQFHPHQWGD\LHWKHGDWH
RIWKHSXEOLFDQQRXQFHPHQWRIGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJ7KHVL]HTXLQWLOHVZHUHIRUPHGGD\VEHIRUH
the announcement dates. If we define t as event date then we use t-5 dayV¶VL]HWRIRUPTXLQWLOHVEDVHG
on the size. In forming the quintiles CARs are first sorted by year according to size. Each year CARs 
are then sorted in quintiles by size. Finally, they are sorted in quintiles. By doing so, the year effect 
from Market-to-book quintiles has been removed. P small-large reports the p value of mean difference test 
between CARs from highest market-to-book versus lowest market-to-book quintiles. The last column 
reports chi-square test for differences in means across size quintiles. T-statistics are reported in 




















Table 9. Distribution of Abnormal Returns of Buy Trades by Size & M/B 
 
Low M/B 2 3 4 High M/B 


























































































































































































study methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -220 to -41 relative to the 
event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. The full sample includes GLUHFWRUV¶
trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 purchases and 7,723 sells. All results are reported relative to 
GLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJDQQRXQFHPHQWGD\LHWKHGDWHRIWKHSXEOLFDQQRXQFHPHQWRIGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJ
The M/B and size quintiles were formed 5 days before the announcement dates. If we define t as event date, 
then we use t-GD\V¶0%DQGVL]HWRIRUPTXLQWLOHVEDVHGRQ0%DQGVL]H,QIRUPLQJWKHTXLQWLOHVthe CARs 
were first by year according to M/B and size. Each year then the CARs were sorted in quintiles first by M/B and 
then by size. By doing so, the year effect have been removed from quintiles. T-statistics are reported in 











Table 10. Distribution of Abnormal Returns of Sell Trades by M/B and Size 
 
Low M/B 2 3 4 High M/B 
 


























































































































































































study methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -220 to -41 relative to the 
event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. The full sample includes GLUHFWRUV¶
trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 purchases and 7,723 sells. All results are reported relative to 
GLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJDQQRXQFHPHQWGD\LHWKHGDWHRIWKHSXEOLFDQQRXQFHPHQWRIGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJ
The M/B and size quintiles were formed 5 days before the announcement dates. If we define t as event date, 
then we use t-GD\V¶0%DQGVL]HWRIRUPTXLQWLOHVEDVHGRQ0%DQGVL]H,QIRUPLQJWKHTXLQWLOHVWKH&$5V
were first by year according to M/B and size. Each year then the CARs were sorted in quintiles first by M/B and 
then by size. By doing so, the year effect have been removed from quintiles. T-statistics are reported in 









Table 11. Distribution of CARs by Stock and Market Volatility 
 Stock volatility Quintiles   
 Low 2 3 4 High P
 High-
Low 
2 (4)F  
 Panel A: Buy 
-40,-2 -1.32*** -3.53*** -5.06*** -3.50*** -8.20*** 0.000 30.15*** 
 -5.11 -13.10 -16.41 -11.07 -12.80   
-1,+1 0.75*** 0.66*** 0.85*** 0.45*** 2.35*** 0.000 15.65** 
 10.87 7.09 8.73 3.83 12.36   
+2,+40 2.16*** 1.63*** 1.01*** 2.23*** 3.19*** 0.000 5.3 
 10.55 6.88 3.78 8.56 8.15   
 Panel B: Sell 
-40,-2 5.66*** 4.66*** 3.77*** 4.26*** 9.59*** 0.024 12.95* 
 6.12 5.30 4.38 4.22 6.52   
-1,+1 0.14 -0.45* -0.22 -0.49 0.36 0.692 3.44 
 0.81 -1.78 -0.76 -1.55 0.69   
+2,+40 0.14 -0.20 1.09 -0.95 1.15 0.450 3.36 
 0.18 -0.29 1.29 -0.89 1.04   
Market  volatility Quintiles 
Panel C: Buy 
-40,-2 -7.49*** -4.93*** -2.69*** -1.16*** -5.36*** 0.092 42.90*** 
 -20.71 -11.08 -7.27 -3.95 -12.18   
-1,+1 0.76*** 0.79*** 1.06*** 1.02*** 1.43*** 0.081 3.63 
 7.16 6.54 8.89 8.52 10.38   
+2,+40 0.97*** 1.44*** 0.45* 3.86*** 3.46*** 0.000 29.80*** 
 3.23 4.17 1.78 17.16 13.79   
Panel D: Sell 
-40,-2 7.46*** 6.29*** 5.86*** 5.07*** 3.30*** 0.018 8.78* 
 4.94 6.88 5.75 6.05 3.77   
-1,+1 -0.59 0.24 -0.17 0.15 -0.27 0.496 3.44 
 -1.61 0.66 -0.63 0.42 -0.91   
+2,+40 -1.62 -1.66 0.41 2.21*** 1.89*** 0.007 16.42** 
 -1.45 -1.51 0.52 3.02 2.93   
7KHDERYH WDEOH UHSUHVHQWVFXPXODWLYHDYHUDJH DEQRUPDO UHWXUQV DURXQGGLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJE\
using event study methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -220 
to -41 relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. The full 
sample includes GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDGHV LQ OLVWHGFRPSDQLHV VSOLW LQWRSXUFKDVHV DQG
7,723 sells. All results aUHUHSRUWHGUHODWLYHWRGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJDQQRXQFHPHQWGD\LHWKHGDWH
RIWKHSXEOLFDQQRXQFHPHQWRIGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJStock Volatility is  standard deviation of stock 
returns over -240 to-41 days and Market Volatility is standard deviation of market returns over -240 
to-41 days.  In forming stock volatility quintiles, CARs are sorted by stock volatility. In forming 
market volatility quintiles, CARs are sorted by market volatility. P low-high reports the p value of mean 
difference test between CARs from highest volatility versus lowest volatility quintiles. The last 
column reports chi-square test for differences in means across size quintiles. T-statistics are reported 






Table 12. OLS Results on CARs 
 Panel A: Buy Trades   Panel B: Sell Trades   
 CAR
-1,+1  CAR+2,+40  CAR-1,+1  CAR+2,+40  


























































































Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy -- Yes -- Yes -- Yes -- Yes 
R2adjusted 0.053 0.053 0.042 0.033 0.035 0.020 0.022 0.022 
F (Probability) 5.72 (0.00) 5.40(0.00) 3.53(0.00) 3.73(0.00) 0.46 (0.81) 0.38(0.85) 5.06 (0.00) 4.59 (0.00) 
The above table reports the regression results using the following model. 
 
1 2 3 4( ) /j j j j jCAR Ln Size M B StockVol MktVol BBDum Year IndustryD E E E E N J T         
where, 
,j tCAR  is the CAR of insider trades for the (-1,+1) and (+2,+40) event windows. Model 1 is the model with bull (bear) dummy and industry dummy 
and model 2 is model with year dummy and industry dummy. Ln(size)  is the log of size of the company measured as market value of equity, M/B  is the 
market-to-book ratio.. Stock Vol  is volatility of stock measured by standard deviation over 180 days prior to the event and  Mkt Vol is volatility of market 
measured by standard deviation over the same estimation period. The BB dummy is one if the trade is from bull period (January 1999 to March 2000 and 
January 2004 to December 2007) and zero otherwise. White heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics is reported in parenthesis. The last row reports F-statistics 
with p-values in the parenthesis next to it. ***, ** and * indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Figure 1. Monthly NPR and Market Returns 
 
This figure represents a time series of net purchase ratio (NPR Value) and 6-month prior return (PR6) 
for each month from January 1999 to December 2007. For each month, we calculate the total Pound 
sterling volume (and the total numbers of) insider purchases and sells. We then calculate the NPR by 
dividing the net aggregate value of insider purchases by the total aggregate value of insider 
transactions. Prior Returns (PR6) represents the FTSE All Share Index returns over the 6 months 
before the trade. 
 
Figure 2. Aggregate Insider Trading and Bull (Bear) Market 
 
 
This figure represents a time series of net purchase ratio for each month from January 1999 to 
December 2007. The shaded region is the bull market and contains two periods (January 
1999 to March 2000 and January 2004 to December 2007). For each month, we calculate the 
total numbers of (and the total Pound Sterling volume) insider purchases and sells. We then 
calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate number of insider purchases by the total 





















































































































































Figure 3. Abnormal returns of insider purchases by growth quintiles 
 










































Figure 5.Abnormal returns of insider purchases by size quintiles 
 
 











































                                                 
 
1
 All the studies except Fahlenbrach and Stultz (2011) show that insider have superior knowledge and better 
timing ability. 
2
 For a detailed discussion on the differences in regulations and reporting periods, please see Fidrmuc et al 
(2006) and a discussion on trading bans see Hillier and Marshall (2002). 
3
 Though Gregory et al (forthcoming) analyse value/glamour strategies, their focus is on long run returns. In this 
paper we focus on short run returns.  
4
 Though these bull and bear markets are very well known in financial markets, to avoid any subjectivity, we 
calculate monthly market returns and confirm that market returns remain negative during the bear period and 
market returns remain positive during the bull period.  
5
 In unreported regressions, we use 6, 12 and 18 months prior returns and the results are qualitatively similar. 
6For example, Fidrmuc et al (2006) did not find any significant returns outside the (-20, +20) window. 
7
 Pope et al. (1990) and Gregory et al. (1994) find puzzling results as market model CARs are negative for buy, 
and the returns are substantial. The results change dramatically when they adjust for si]HDVWKH&$5¶VEHFRPH
positive for buys and negative for sells in the post event window. 
8
 We document that returns are larger when market and stock volatility is larger. This could simply be an 
artefact of using CARs, which are flawed for anything other than very short windows. So, one might argue that 
a positive relationship between CARs and returns are unsurprising given the well-known problems of positive 
bias in CARs (Kothari and Werner, 1997). So, we repeat the analysis using BHARs (unreported) and the results 
remain qualitatively similar. Hence, we conclude that insiders are more knowledgeable in volatile stocks.      
